The primary goal of the secure socket layer protocol (SSL) is to provide confidentiality and data integrity between two communicating entities. Since the most computationally expensive step in the SSL handshake protocol is the server's RSA decryption, it is introduced that the proposed secret exchange algorithm can be used to speed up the SSL session initialization. This paper first points out that the previous batch method is impractical since it requires multiple certificates. It then proposes a unique certificate scheme to overcome the problem. The optimization strategy, which is based on the constrained model considering the user requirements-aware security ranking, focuses on the optimal result in different public key sizes. It is also introduced that the parameter is optimized when integrating user requirements for Internet QoS, such as the stability of the system and the tolerable response time. Finally, the proposed algorithm is evaluated to be practical and efficient through both analysis and simulation studies.
some Quality of Service (QoS) that may be satisfied with web users has become a new issue.
Web-based applications rely on the HTTPS protocol to guarantee security and privacy in transactions ranging from e-banking, e-commerce, and e-procurement to those that deal with sensitive data, such as career and identity information [2] . The SSL protocol allows the server and the client to authenticate each other and to negotiate an encryption algorithm and cryptographic keys before transmitting and receiving the first byte of data [3] . However, such a protocol needs intensive computational resources due to the cost of public-key operations [4] .
In the web context, one of the main factors is the direct consequence of expensive public-key operations performed by servers as part of each SSL handshake. Since most SSL-enabled servers use RSA, the burden of performing many costly decryption operations can be very detrimental to the server performance.
For example, a typical Pentium server (running Linux and Apache) can handle about 322 HTTP connections per second at full capacity, but only 24 SSL connections per second; and a Sun 450 (running Solaris and Apache) fell from 500 to 3 connections per second [5] . There are several ways to improve the performance of the SSL handshake protocol:
1. Hardware: Obviously, a specific circuit can improve the performance. This solution may not be a good solution for small or medium-sized servers [6] . 2. Session Caching: The cache allows subsequent connections to resume an earlier TLS session, and thus, to reuse the result of an earlier computation. Research has suggested that, indeed, session caching helps to improve the web server performance [1] . However, the cache technology has no help to speed up the session setup. 3. Software: Many algorithmic approaches for speeding up SSL's performance on a web server are presented in the literature [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . They are designed for heavilyloaded web servers handling many concurrent SSL sessions. However, these schemes ignore the satisfaction of the user requirements for QoS, such as the stability of the system and the tolerable response time.
Being aware of the computational imbalance between clients and server in the SSL handshake protocol, we propose a secret exchange algorithm to overcome the problem. The starting point of the proposed scheme is a technique due to the batch RSA decryption [14, 15] . This paper adapts the certificate mechanism so as to provide the SSL setup with a unique certificate issued by the Certificate Authority (CA). This paper also proposes the constrained model integrating the user-perceived quality into secure web server design [16, 17] . This paper also optimizes the batch size by the constrained model, which meets the user requirements-aware security ranking focusing on the optimal result in different public key sizes. In addition, the proposed scheme uses the approximate analytical solution of the mean response time to optimize the batch size of the server. It is designed for heavily-loaded web servers handling many concurrent SSL sessions. Notice that a preliminary version of this paper appeared in the paper [18] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the secret exchange algorithm in the SSL handshake protocol. The proposed constrained model of the QoS-aware optimization strategy is presented in Sect. 3. The QoS-aware optimization algorithm is presented in Sect. 4. Section 5 validates the proposed solutions through both analysis and simulation studies, and Sect. 6 concludes the paper.
Secret exchange algorithm in the SSL handshake protocol
The proposed scheme in this paper focuses on the parameter optimization-based technology, which is a software-only approach for speeding up SSL's performance on a web server. The starting point of the proposed scheme is a technique due to using the batch RSA decryption. Being aware of the computational imbalance between clients and server in the SSL handshake protocol, we proposed algorithms to overcome the problem.
The following Algorithms 1 and 2 are secret exchange algorithms of the SSL handshake at the server side and the client side, respectively. When using small public exponent e 1 and e 2 , it is possible to decrypt two cipher texts for approximately the price of one [14] . This technology facilitates more favorable load distribution by requiring the clients to perform more work (as part of encryption) and the server to perform commensurately less work, thus leading to better SSL throughput at the server.
In the standard SSL protocol, each client encrypts a 48-byte pre-master secret as the encryption exponent, and the server decrypts the cipher text independently so as to get the pre-master secret. Algorithm 1 obtains the pre-master secret from multiple clients and hence, improves the performance significantly.
The parameter b is the size of multi-clients for aggregate decryption. The public key is made of two integers N, e . The value e is called the encryption exponent. Given b, distinct and pairwise relatively prime public keys e 1 , . . . , e b , all share a common modulus N = pq. The N is the product of two large primes p and q. The security parameter n is the bit length of the public modulus N , and k is the bit length of the bigger of e i at Steps Using the binary tree construction, we are working from the leaves to the root. At every internal node, each encrypted message v i is placed (as v) in the leaf node labeled with its corresponding e i . The root node v's value is percolated up the tree using the following recursive step, applied at each internal node at Steps 16-21 of Algorithm 1. E L , E R are the left child and the right child of each product of the internal node at Step 17 of Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1
Secret exchange algorithm at the server side 1: Given b distinct and pairwise relatively prime public keys e 1 , . . . , e b 2: //all sharing a common modulus N = pq, relatively prime to φ(N) = (p − 1)(q − 1). 3: //n is the bit length of the public modulus N and k is the bit length of the bigger of e i . 4 3 Unique certificate scheme in the SSL handshake protocol Our unique certificate method is to reuse the message ServerHello in the protocol. For simplicity, we only show the related processes and the modified information in the standard SSL handshake protocol (see Fig. 1 ).
The following procedure is the unique certificate scheme for the SSL handshake protocol: (1) The clients send a client hello massage, which includes cipherspects to the server and create random nonce r c , respectively. Here, the cipherspects specify the bulk data encryption algorithm, the MAC algorithm, and the cryptographic attributes [3] . (2) The server responds with a server hello message that includes server's public-key certificate and a random nonce r s . In this improvement, e i and e i are actually a part of ServerHello.random. The server only needs to send unique certificates to all the clients. (3) The clients choose a secret random 48-byte pre-master secret m 1 and m 2 by inputting values m 1 , m 2 , r c , r s into hash function f (). It then encrypts m i with e i , which is different from the server's public key, and attaches the cipher text to a client key exchange message that is sent to the server. (4) The server decrypts the pre-master secret m 1 and m 2 simultaneously using Algorithm 1, and uses it to compute the shared master secret s 1 and s 2 , respectively. The client will verify the certificate as usual, but encrypt the pre-master secret with received e i , instead of the public exponent in the certificate. Therefore, no extra charge is required, and it is easy Fig. 1 Unique Certificate Scheme for a partial handshake to manage the certificate. On the other hand, since the certificate is used to prove the owner who knows the factors of the RSA modulus N only, this adaptation does not undermine the security strength of the SSL protocol.
Constrained model of QoS-aware optimization strategy
The optimization strategy, which is based on the constrained model considering the user requirements-aware security ranking, focuses on the optimal result in different public key sizes. Using the full binary tree as a guide, working from the leaves to the root, for constructing the serial number for every exponent of the leaves, the binary length of the serial number is equal to log 2 b . In other words, the depth of the leaves is equal to log 2 b .
According to
Step 27 of Algorithm 1, the algorithm takes the recursive result from the left child and right child, and the result associated with this node is
The computation phase is to break up the product m to obtain the plaintext m i = v 1/e i i , which we wish to decrypt simultaneously. Note that v l and v r have already been computed and stored, as the left and right branch values of the root, during the tree-based computation of m at Steps 12-22 of Algorithm 1. By definition, X is the unique solution ((X = 0 mod E L ) and (X = 1 mod E R ) == true). Note that log 2 X < log 2 e and X L ← X/E L ; X R ← (X − 1)/E R , we can get log 2 X L + log 2 X R < log 2 X < log 2 e with e = b i=1 e i [14] . Because the depth of the leaves is equal to log 2 b , for every plaintext result m i = v Proof We can easily get log 2 N = n , where n is defined as the binary length of modulus N .
We can easily get n (log 2 n) 2 < n, because n is a positive number and n > 2. Also, because the function log 2 x increases with x, we can get log 2 n (log 2 n) 2 < log 2 n. Because of choosing the batch size b, which satisfies 2 ≤ b ≤ n (log 2 n) 2 , we can derive log 2 b ≤ log 2 n (log 2 n) 2 and log 2 b(
log 2 e i + log 2 N). Due to Lemma 1, where
log 2 e i = log 2 e and log 2 N = n, it can be described as:
log 2 e i + log 2 N) < log 2 e(log 2 n) + n. By choosing the e i exponents to be polynomial in n, thus, e < n, the following equation is derived as:
log 2 e(log 2 n) + n < (log 2 n) 2 + n. Then, Theorem 1 is proved.
The constrained model considering the user requirements-aware security ranking is proposed based on Theorem 1. We optimize the batch size b for a specific modulus size, and obtain better results for smaller batches if the modulus is relatively small. According to Theorem 1, the batch size is optimized as log 2 n (log 2 n) 2 in this constrained model.
QoS-aware optimization algorithm
Let the decryption time of Algorithm 1 in the SSL handshake time be T b .
The performance analysis of Algorithm 1 can be divided as multiplication at Steps 16-20, exponentiation at Steps 21-24, and division computation phases at Steps 27-33.
We can estimate the cost of e = b i=1 e i is (b − 1)n 2 . The cost of computing 1/e is (b − 1)n 2 . The main computation cost is exponentiation cost (3k − 2)n 2 + o(n 2 ) with the exponent e i , where the bit length of e i is k. The whole cost in the multiplication phase is b((3k/2) + 3) + o(n 2 ).
In the exponentiation computation phase, Steps 21-24 cost 3n 3 + n 2 + o(n 2 ). In the division phase, Step 31 mainly includes one exponentiation cost b(3bk − 2)n 2 + o(n 2 ) and two exponentiation cost (3(b − 1)k − 2)n 2 + o(n 2 ).
Step 31 also includes one inversion of n-bit integers. Inversion of n-bit integers is equivalent to 20 modular multiplications. The cost of modular multiplication of two n-bit integers can be estimated as 2n 2 + 2n [15, 18] .
The whole cost in Algorithm 1 is estimated as 3n 3 + n 2 (44b + 3b 3 − 1) + o(n 2 ). As a result, the decryption time of Algorithm 1 T b is estimated as:
Since T b is the majority of the service time, the batching service time of the server τ is T b roughly.
Lemma 2 To satisfy the client's requirement for the stability of the system, the decryption time in SSL handshake T b is less than the batch size multiplied by the mean Poisson distributed arrival time interval when the time in the Batch Queue Model M/D/1, thus:
Proof Let X i (i = 1, 2 . . . . . .) be the arrival time interval of two consecutive requests, and Y be the time interval of b consecutive requests. Batch Queue Model M/D/1 has been described in our previous work [18] .
If the system achieves the stability when the time t → ∞ for the M/D/1 queue model, T b < E(Y ), where E(Y )
is the expected value of Y . Because X i is a random variable with independent identical distribution, the average arrival time interval of b consecutive requests is:
Then, Lemma 2 is proved.
Lemma 3 In the Batch Queue Model M/D/1, to satisfy the client's requirement for the stability of the system, thus, T q < b/2λ.
Proof In the Batch Queue Model M/D/1, the value of T q is derived following the equation:
where T r = 0.5τ ; due to Lemma 2, it can be easily described as: Tolerable response time (TRT) is defined as the delay time a client can tolerate between a request for a secure web page and receiving the page [16] [17] [18] [19] . The real response time (RRT) is the interval between the receipt of the end of transmission of an SSL-based inquiry message and the beginning of the transmission of a response message to the station originating the SSL handshake.
Theorem 2 In the Batch Queue Model M/D/1, to satisfy the client's requirement for tolerable response time, RRT < T RT , thus, ⇒ b < 0.4(λ × T RT + 1).
Proof The mean real response time (RRT ) is denoted as the sum of T q , T c , and the T b .
In the Batch Queue Model M/D/1, the value bound of the upper limit of T q is estimated as b/2λ derived from Lemma 3 (refer to (6) ).
The value bound of the upper limit of T b is estimated as b/λ derived from Lemma 2 (refer to (2)).
T c is the mean time of waiting for the other client in the same batching, which is easily derived that the max value of T c is (b − 1/λ).
On the other hand, it is supposed that the solution of b should satisfy the approximate bound, which is derived from Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and described as the following equation:
Then, Theorem 2 is proved.
Combining the user requirements for QoS, such as security ranking, the stability of the system, and tolerable response time, these strategies aim to optimize the parameter b, which is the size of multi-clients for aggregate decryption in Algorithm 1. QoS-aware optimization algorithm satisfies these strategies in this paper.
According to Theorem 2, the initial value of b is estimated at Step 4 of Algorithm 3 with T RT and λ as input values. According to Theorem 1, b is estimated at Step 5 with P KS as input value. If the condition of the optimal batch cannot be satisfied, the algorithm has the ability to fall back on conventional_RSA_decryption(), which is the decryption with plain RSA, which is described at Step 9 and Step 18. The computation of T b is performed using (1) at Step 12.
Step 11 sorts b to satisfy the max solution of T b < b/λ according to Lemma 2 in the descending order from the upper limit computing at Step 7 to two. The computation of T b _real is performed by executing Algorithm 1. 6 Validation of analytical models and performance evaluation study
Validation of analytical models
The analytical results and simulation results are executed on a machine with an Intel Pentium IV processor clocked at 3.20 GHz and 1 GB RAM. Specifically, this paper performs the simulation of the SSL handshake secret exchange algorithm with very small public exponents, namely, e = 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, etc. It is assumed that the value (T RT ) is equal to 1 second and 8 seconds as examples both in the analytical model and simulation. It is assumed that the values of the public key sizes (P KS) are equal to 512, 1024, and 2048 bit lengths as examples both in the analytical model and simulation. Table 1 validates the result of Optimal_b, described by the constrained model of the QoS-aware optimization strategy. It is assumed that T RT is equal to 1 s in the analytical model and simulation. Due to small arrival rates, b is almost uniformly calculated by our analytical model. Since arrival rates are small (i.e., λ < 2), there is very little opportunity to batch, and therefore, the solution of b is relatively small. Even at a higher arrival rate, the analytical result and simulation result are very close to each other. The solution of the optimal batch size is increased with λ, both in the analytical model and simulation when λ < 30 (i.e., P KS = 1024 bits), approximately. Otherwise, RRT is not increased, obviously. The solution of b is decreased with λ when λ > 60 (i.e., P KS = 1024 bits), approximately. The solution of b cannot satisfy the 2048  512 1024  2048   1  ------2  2  2  2  2  2  2   3  2  2  2  2  2  2   4  3  3  3  3 But, with a non-batching system, it becomes unstable when λ > 1/T rsa = 1/0.16 = 6.25 for 2048-bit keys due to the fact that a non-batching system becomes unstable when λ > τ .
Performance evaluation
The simulation result of the RSA decryption time T rsa with a larger public exponent, namely e = 65537, is about 16, 32, and 130 ms with public modulus N that is 512 bits in length, 1024 bits in length, and 2048 bits in length, respectively, and is tested using reiterative results.
The multi-factor RSA [12] can expect a theoretical speedup of around 2.25 with n = pqr and 3.38 for n = p 2 q. Experiments show the real speedup to be around 1.73 and 2.3, respectively. Rebalanced RSA offers a theoretical speedup of 3.6, but the actual speedup is 3.2 for 1024-bit keys. Specifically, d is chosen to be close to n such that both d mod (p − 1) and d mod (q − 1) are small integers [12] . The resulting public exponent e also becomes close to n, which is much larger than typical values (i.e., e = 3, 17, or 65537). It is in fact so large that Microsoft Internet Explorer (IE) cannot accept it; SB (Shacham and Boneh) scheme [10] offers a speedup factor of 2.5 for 1024-bit keys. The downside is obvious because CAs charge per certificate regardless of whether the certificate is for the same site or not. It also ignores the satisfaction of the user requirements for QoS, where the batch size is equal to four.
Our algorithm offers a speedup factor of 2.76 (Table 2) for a 1024-bit key, which is used in the SSL handshake protocol frequently. Typically, b is equal to 6 for optimal (Table 1) . Obviously, our scheme not only achieves a better speedup factor, but also overcomes these disadvantages of the previous schemes. All the methods are backward compatible with standard RSA. Also, all speedup methods discussed are based on 1024-bit RSA and are relative to the cost of performing plain RSA decryptions. It is assumed that T RT is equal to 8 seconds in Fig. 2 . Figure 2 shows that RRT is almost linear when λ is relatively small. This is due to the fact that RRT = T q + T c + T b (refer to (7)). When λ is relatively small, the main contribution to RRT is made by T c (i.e., λ = 10, P KS = 1024 bits). It is evident that the time T c is increased linearly with b. T b is also increased with b. Therefore, RRT is also increased with b when λ is relatively large (i.e., λ = 80, P KS = 1024 bits). Figure 3 illustrates the analytical mean response time RRT, comparing our simulation results and that of the SB (Shacham and Boneh) scheme (i.e. T RT = 1 P KS = 1024 bits). When λ is approximately equal to 30, RRT reaches its maximum, which is equal to 828 ms, approximately, whereas the value is less than 1 second and decreased with λ when using optimal batch size b (see Fig. 3 ). In the SB scheme, RRT behaves poorly, especially when λ does not exceed 10 requests/sec (see Fig. 3 ). When λ is larger than 10 and less than 100, approximately, the performance of our scheme and the SB scheme are all satisfied with the clients' requirement of tolerable response time. However, it is shown that the solutions of b (Table 1) are larger than four. That means the optimal scheme can submit more decryption requests to decryption device than the SB scheme. The analytical and simulation results of RRT shows that our scheme behaves nicely. A non-batching system becomes unstable when λ > 1/T rsa = 1/0.032 = 31.25 for 1024-bit keys. When the non-batching system is stable, the mean response time T can be estimated as (8) [18] . The mean service time τ is deterministic in the nonbatching in the M/D/1 queue model. Since T rsa is the majority of the service time, the mean service time τ of the server is roughly T rsa : Figure 4 (T RT = 8) illustrates the comparison of the mean response time of our scheme with non-batching scheme. The vertical axis in each graph is the mean response time over the batch size divided by the mean response time with non-batching scheme. The optimal batch size in our scheme is equal to 10 when λ = 30. The speedup of the mean response time is an optimal one that is equal to 6.69, approximately. The optimal batch size in our scheme is equal to 2 when λ = 2. The speedup of the mean response time is an optimal one that is equal to 1.94, approximately. It is clear that with the optimal batch size, our scheme has significant advantages while costing less.
Conclusion
This paper proposes the secret exchange algorithm in the SSL handshake protocol. This paper also proposes a method of assigning the set of public exponents e i only using the unique certificate in the SSL handshake protocol. Combining the user requirements for Quality of Service (QoS), such as security ranking, the stability of the system, and the tolerable response time, these strategies aim to optimize the parameter b, which is the size of multi-clients for aggregate decryption. The parameter optimization-based SSL handshake is a viable option for secure communications. Currently, we mainly investigated this work based on the Internet with a high speed client/server computing paradigm. This paper also proposes an optimization strategy based on the constrained model considering the user requirements-aware security ranking. Other optimization strategies are based on the constrained model considering the users' requirements for the stability of the system and the client's requirement for the tolerable time. These optimal strategies focus on the optimal result in different public key sizes. Combining the users' requirements for Quality of Service (QoS), there are many factors which should be considered in real web application development. The evaluation criterion of web service's performance is not only restricted to the response time and the throughput when the server handles SSL requests. In our future work, we will consider establishing more evaluation criterion of web service's performance and propose optimal strategies combing more users' requirements for Quality of Service.
